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NOTES
ABOVE THE LAW:
THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO SEEK JUSTICE

AND THE PERFORMANCE OF SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS
Ross Galin*
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and as impossible
to define as those which mark a gentleman. And those who need to
be told would not understand it anyway. A sensitiveness to fair play
and sportsmanship is perhaps the best protection against the abuse
of power, and the citizen's safety lies in the prosecutor who tempers
zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and not victims, who

serves the law and not factional purposes, and who approaches his
task with humility.
Robert H.Jackson'
INTRODUCTION

In 1987 the United States Sentencing Commission fulfilled the
purpose for which Congress created it by enacting the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines ("guidelines"). 2 Intended to create uniform
sentences, the guidelines established a clear and rigid sentencing
structure with narrow ranges within which federal judges must
sentence the guilty.' A judge can grant a federal criminal defendant a
sentence below the prescribed range only if the governmentordinarily the prosecutor-makes a formal section 5Kl.1 ("5K")
motion to the court requesting a downward departure based on
substantial assistance 5K motions are an important tool used by
prosecutors to induce and reward both guilty pleas and cooperation
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Bruce A. Green for his guidance and insight, my family for their
support, and my wife, Camille, for her love, encouragement, and patience.
1. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor (Address Delivered at the Second
Annual Conference of United States Attorneys, Apr. 1. 1940), reprintedin 31 J. Am.
Inst. L. & Criminology 3, 6 (1940).
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See infra Part I.A.
4. See infra Part I.B.
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by one criminal defendant in the prosecution of another.5 Typically,
the government will promise to move the court for a lesser sentence if
the defendant provides useful assistance, namely candid information
and truthful testimony, in the prosecution of another criminal. The
ultimate decision whether to move for a downward departure is left
solely in the hands of the prosecutor, even where the prosecutor has
entered into a formal agreement. 6 Courts are extremely reluctant to
question the decisions of prosecutors in the exercise of this discretion.7
Essentially, courts will compel a prosecutor to submit a downward
departure motion only if the prosecutor is not acting in good faith
when refusing to make the motion.8 This good faith legal standard
forces prosecutors to abide by basic contract law principles and
prevents them from acting in an unconstitutional manner, but still
allows them great leeway in choosing whether to honor their
agreements. Consider the following three cases.
1.

United States v. Jimenez9

As part of a lengthy investigation of motorcycle gangs in the
Denver, Colorado, area, 10 federal prosecutors charged Charles
Joseph Jimenez with multiple counts of conspiracy to distribute
cocaine, conspiracy to defraud the United States of taxes, and
various Interstate Travel Act offenses." Jimenez agreed to plead
guilty to the cocaine and tax charges; in exchange, the prosecutor
promised, among other things, that he would recommend that the
defendant be sentenced to no more than seven years and that the
sentence be served concurrently with a prior sentence. 12 In
accordance with the agreement, Jimenez waived his right
to trial and
3
entered a plea of guilty to the cocaine and tax charges.
In the period between the entering of the plea and sentencing, the
government came to believe that Jimenez had leaked to gang
members grand jury testimony that was provided to him by his
lawyer.' 4 The prosecutor informed the court of the government's
beliefs, 15 and noted at the sentencing hearing that he was
recommending a seven-year concurrent sentence only because he
had agreed to do so. 16 He went on to explain, however, that
although he could not sustain an intimidation charge against the
defendant simply on the basis of the leaked testimony, he was upset
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See U. S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5Kl.1 (1998) [hereinafter USSG].
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part I.C.
928 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1991).
See id. at 359.
See id. at 358.
See id. at 359.
See id. at 358-59.
See id. at 359.
See id. at 360.
See id.
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by the defendant's conduct and hoped the court would consider
Jimenez's actions in reaching its decision as to an appropriate
sentence.17 Not surprisingly, the court announced that it would not
follow the prosecutor's seven-year recommendation and instead
sentenced Jimenez to twenty years in prison on the cocaine charge
and five years on the tax charge, to be served concurrently with one
another but consecutive to the prior sentence.1 8
2.

United States v. Forney9

As part of a plea agreement with the United States Attorney's
Office for the Middle District of Florida, Mark Forney pleaded
guilty to conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine.20 According to
the agreement, Forney was to plead guilty, cooperate fully with the
government in its investigation, and provide the government with
truthful information and testimony as required in the future,'
Forney cooperated based on the understanding that the prosecutor
would exercise his power under section 5Kl.1 of the guidelines to
submit a letter to the court detailing Forney's assistance and
encouraging the court to depart from the guidelines and sentence
Forney to a lesser sentence. 3 Forney's understanding with the
prosecutor was memorialized in a formal written agreement.24
Forney complied fully with the agreement by providing the
government with "a lot of information" and identifying pictures
shown to him.25 Despite Forney's cooperation, the government
decided not to recommend a downward departure from the
guidelines. In fact, the district judge asked the Assistant United
States Attorney ("AUSA") twice if the government intended to
make a motion for a downward departure. Both times, the AUSA
answered negatively. 26 The government based its refusal not on a
lack of cooperation, but on the notion that the assistance provided
by Forney was not "substantial" because it did not lead to any
arrests.27 The reason no arrests were made, however, was that the
government decided that the crimes were too minor to prosecute.'
At Forney's sentencing, he requested that he be given the benefit of
a downward departure on the basis that he had fully satisfied his end
of the agreement. 29 Forney also insisted that had he known the
government would deem the crimes he provided information about
17. See id at 360-61.
18. See id at 361.
19. 9 F.3d 1492 (11th Cir. 1993).

20. See id. at 1494-95.
21. See id-

22. See id. at 1497.
23. See id. at 1495.

24.
25.
26.
27.

See id at 1494-95.
Id. at 1497.
See id at 1496.
See id. at 1497.

28. See id-

29. See id.
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to be too small to act 30upon, he never would have signed the
agreement or pled guilty.
The trial judge refused to grant the downward departure and
sentenced Forney to 120 months in prison-the statutory mandatory
minimum-and five years of supervised release.3
The judge
explained that under the law he could not depart from the guidelines
unless he received a substantial assistance motion from the
government.3 z The judge further explained that the guidelines
placed the decision to offer a downward departure motion
exclusively in the hands of the AUSA, who serves as the
government's representative in criminal litigation. 33 The prosecutor
had even more leeway here because under the terms of the written
agreement, only the prosecutor could "consider whether such
cooperation qualifies as 'substantial assistance."'' "
The judge
concluded by stating, "[s]o it seems to me as a matter of law I am
completely without discretion to depart or impose any sentence in
this case except 120 to 121 months." 35 The district36 court's decision
was subsequently affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit.
3.

United States v. Brechner37

Following the filing of tax evasion charges against him, Milton
Brechner and the government entered into a written plea
agreement.38 The agreement provided that if the United States
Attorney's Office determined that Brechner had cooperated fully,
provided substantial assistance, and otherwise complied with the
terms of the agreement, the government would move for a
downward departure on his sentence under section 5K1.. 39
"Brechner went to considerable lengths to help the government
obtain incriminating evidence against another person."4
At a debriefing session with the government, the prosecutor
asked Brechner if he had ever received any kickbacks from two of
his suppliers. Brechner initially responded that he had not. 41 After
a brief break in the session, requested by Brechner's attorney
immediately following his client's answer, Brechner corrected
himself and admitted to having received kickbacks from the
suppliers.42 After the prosecutor told Brechner that he could have a
"fresh start," he proceeded to give more details about the
30. See id.

31. See id. at 1498.
32. See id. at 1497.
33. See id. at 1498.
34. Id. at 1495.

35. Id. at 1497.
36. See id. at 1504.
37. 99 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996).
38. See id. at 97.

39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 98.

42. See id.

20001

SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS

1249

kickbacks.43

At Brechner's sentencing, however, the government refused to
move for a downward departure.44 The prosecutor indicated that
this refusal stemmed from Brechner's misrepresentations and the
fact that it would be difficult to prosecute the other individual with
only Brechner as a witness. 4' Brechner moved to compel the 5K
motion, alleging prosecutorial bad faith.' The trial court granted
Brechner's motion on the grounds that his cooperation was
sufficient to warrant a 5K motion despite his false statements.47 The
trial court's ruling was subsequently overturned on appeal by the
Second Circuit under the theory that Brechner's false statements
represented a breach of contract.4
In each of these three cases, the prosecutor's actions were found to
be legal and the courts refused to force the government to offer a 5K
motion. But did these prosecutors act consistently with their ethical
duty to seek justice?4 9 In light of the extremely lenient legal standard
that allows a prosecutor to rescind almost any substantial assistance
agreement entered into, how should a prosecutor who has formed
such an agreement behave in order to fulfill the prosecutor's duty to
seek justice? This Note considers whether ethical considerations may
require a prosecutor to honor a cooperation agreement and thus make
a 5K motion even when the law does not so require. Part I of this
Note begins with a background discussion of the guidelines' purpose
and the manner in which they function. Part I then focuses on section
5K1.1 itself, the courts' treatment of 5K, and the development of the
legal standard of review regarding the responsibilities of prosecutors
who have entered into these agreements. Part II analyzes the ethical
responsibilities of the prosecutor in the criminal justice system and
distinguishes it from that of other lawyers, particularly with respect to
the negotiation and disposition of contracts. Part II concludes with a
discussion of why the prosecutor's duty to seek justice should render a
prosecutor's ability to back away from a cooperation agreement more
difficult than the law allows.50 Part III presents a number of
hypothetical scenarios designed to demonstrate how the duty to seek
justice should govern prosecutors' behavior in a variety of practical
situations involving substantial assistance agreements.
43. Id. at 98-99. The clear implication of "fresh start" was that the prosecutor
would pretend the false answer had never been given.
44. See id.
at 99.
45. See iL
46. See iL For a discussion of the good faith standard of review, see infra Part
I.C.
47. See Brechner,99 F.3d at 99.
48. See idi at 99-100.
49. See infra Part II.B.
50. At times this Note uses the terms "substantial assistance agreement" and
"cooperation agreement" interchangeably. The two phrases are synonymous in the
context of this Note.
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I. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE
AGREEMENTS, AND THE COURTS: A RECIPE FOR PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION

This part begins by describing the reasons for the sentencing
guidelines' enactment, their purpose, and the way judges use them to
sentence criminal defendants. It then explores section 5K1.1 of the
guidelines and substantial assistance motions. This part concludes
with an examination of the standard of review established by courts
with respect to defendants' claims that the government breached a
duty to submit a downward departure motion.
A.

The United States Sentencing Guidelines

Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 198451 in response
to years of public discontent over the wide variance in sentences for
similar federal criminal offenses."
The Sentencing Reform Act
created the United States Sentencing Commission and empowered
the commission to develop a comprehensive set of federal sentencing
guidelines designed to eliminate inconsistent sentences. 3 On April
13, 1987, the proposed guidelines were submitted to Congress for
review, and on November 1, 1987, the first edition of the guidelines
went into effect nationally.'
The basic approach of the guidelines is to improve the criminal
justice system by creating a fair and effective sentencing system.5
One commentator notes:
The Guidelines' purpose was threefold: to combat crime through an
effective, fair sentencing system; to achieve reasonable uniformity in
sentencing by narrowing the range of sentences that could be
imposed for similar offenses committed by similar offenders; and to
seek proportionality in sentencing by imposing different sentences
51. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3150
(1988)).
52. See Melissa M. McGrath, Federal Sentencing Law: ProsecutorialDiscretion in
Determining DeparturesBased on Defendant's Cooperation Violates Due Process, 15
S. I11.U. L.J. 321, 321 (1991); Paul M. Secunda, Cleaning Up the Chicken Coop of
Sentencing Uniformity: Guidingthe Discretionof FederalProsecutorsThrough the Use
of the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1267, 1272 (1997).
Prior to the enactment of the guidelines, criminal sentences were left almost
entirely to the discretion of judges. Judges could receive input from prosecutors,
probation officers, or others, but there were no formal guidelines that judges were
required to follow. Several studies indicated that the lack of formal guidelines led to
widely disparate sentences. This disparity was perceived as being unfair and in
conflict with the notion that similarly situated defendants should be treated equally,
and in turn, led many legal scholars and lawyers to believe that the discretion of
judges should be restricted so as to lead to more uniform sentences. See McGrath,
supra, at 324-25.
53. See Secunda, supra note 52, at 1272.
54. See USSG, supra note 5, ch. 1, pt. A, introduction.
55. See id.
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for criminal conduct of differing severity.5"

To achieve these goals, the guidelines establish a system in which
the severity of the crime committed is graphed on one axis, juxtaposed
against the criminal history of the offender on another axis. s' The axis
that determines the magnitude of the offense is comprised of fortythree levels. Movement along the criminal-history axis is determined
by prior convictions, while movement on the offense-level axis is
determined by the nature of the crime as well as any aggravating or
mitigating factors. 5 Once the intersection of the offense-level and the
criminal history is determined, the court is presented with a very
narrow range of months to which the defendant can be sentenced.59
While there is a debate as to whether the guidelines reduce the
variance in sentences,' there is no debate that judges' sentencing
discretion has been greatly reduced.6 ' Equally clear is that a
significant portion of the discretion lost by judges has been transferred
to prosecutors. 62
B.

Section 5K1.1: SubstantialAssistance Motions

Section 5K1.1 was enacted as part of the original guidelines in
1987,63 and amended to its current form in 1989.1 The crucial portion
56. Secunda, supra note 52, at 1272; see also Julie Gyurci, Note, Prosecutorial
Discretion to Bring a Substantial Assistance Motion Pursuant to a Plea Agreement:
Enforcing a Good Faith Standard,78 Minn. L Rev. 1253, 1256 (1994) (describing the
three goals of the guidelines as uniformity, proportionality, and honesty in
sentencing).
57. See USSG, supra note 5, sentencing table; Secunda, supra note 52, at 1273;
Gyurci, supra note 56, at 1256-57.
58. See USSG, supra note 5, sentencing table: Secunda, supra note 52, at 1273;
Gyurci, supra note 56, at 1257.
59. See USSG, supra note 5, sentencing table; Secunda, supra note 52, at 1273;
Gyurci, supra note 56, at 1257.
60. See, e.g., McGrath, supra note 52, at 351 (claiming that by allowing downward
departures to some, but not all, defendants, the purpose of the guidelines is
undermined and sentences consequently lack uniformity); Secunda, supra note 52, at
1269 (arguing that the tremendous discretion given to prosecutors defeats the
guidelines' purpose of fairness and uniformity in sentencing).
61. See generally Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing
Guidelines in the Federal Courts (1998) (discussing how the guidelines have changed
judging by restricting the discretion afforded judges in sentencing): see also Secunda,
supranote 52, at 1278 (same).
62. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pitt. L Rev. 393, 41819 (1992) (explaining that the guidelines have restricted the power of judges while
producing a corresponding increase in the power of prosecutors); Cynthia K. Y. Lee,
From Gatekeeper to Concierge:Reigning in the FederalProsecutor'sErpandingPower
over SubstantialAssistance Departures,50 Rutgers L. Rev. 199, 234-35 (1997) (arguing
that recent court decisions have made clear that the prosecutor has the ability to
determine whether a court will be able to exercise discretion and depart from the
prescribed sentencing range); Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of
CriminalJustice, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2117, 2141 (1998) (discussing the power of the
prosecutor to, in effect, impose sentences under the guidelines).
63. See USSG, supra note 5, § 5K1.1 cmt. (historical note).
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of the section reads, "[u]pon motion of the government stating that
the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation
or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the
court may depart from the guidelines. '65 This section is policy-driven
and aimed at recognizing the importance of a defendant's assistance in
the prosecution of criminal cases.66 As such, 5K seeks both to induce
cooperation and to treat it as a mitigating circumstance in
sentencing.67 Defendants facing the possibility of a stern sentence
under the guidelines will frequently offer prosecutors information
about another criminal in exchange for a promise by prosecutors to
move the court for a lighter sentence than that prescribed by the
guidelines. Such an offer may be made by prosecutors as well as by
defendants.
Once entered into, the agreement is ordinarily
memorialized in a formal writing that serves as a contract between the
defendant and the government. 68 While 5K provides the statutory
ability to enter into a cooperation agreement, it is the language of the
contract itself that establishes both the general and specific
requirements that must be met by each party.
5K's language has been interpreted by courts as placing the decision
to offer a downward departure for substantial assistance in the hands
of the prosecutor, the government's representative in the criminal
justice system. 69 By granting this power exclusively to prosecutors, the
guidelines allow prosecutors to provide defendants with the most
lenient sentencing alternative.7" A defendant knows that the judge
must stay within the guidelines unless the prosecutor submits a
downward departure motion, and the prosecutor will do so only if the
defendant both pleads guilty and provides substantial assistance.7 '
It is clear from the wording of section 5K1.1 that the primary
64. See id. app. C, amend. 290.

65. Id. § 5K1.1.

5Kl.l(a) lists five factors that may be used by the court in

determining the appropriate reduction in sentence:
1. The court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the
defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's
evaluation of the assistance rendered;
2. The truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or
testimony provided by the defendant;
3. The nature and extent of the defendant's assistance;
4. Any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his
family resulting from his assistance;
5. The timeliness of the defendant's assistance.
Id. § 5K1.1(a).
66. See id. § 5Kl.1, cmt.; McGrath, supra note 52, at 332.
67. See USSG, supra note 5, § 5Kl.1 cmt.
68. See infra note 214 for an example of a typical substantial assistance
agreement.
69. See infra Part I.C.

70. See generally Lynch, supra note 62 (arguing that prosecutors actually
administer justice based on their power to use the guidelines to extract pleas).
71. See id. at 2132.
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purpose of the section is to induce cooperation by offering reward.
Not to be overlooked, however, is the benefit to the government in
obtaining guilty pleas. As the Supreme Court in Santobello v. New
York' recognized, plea agreements help facilitate the efficiency of the
justice system. 73 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger
explained that "[t]he disposition of criminal charges by agreement
between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called
'plea bargaining,' is an essential component of the administration of
justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged."'74 The Chief
Justice noted that were every criminal charge to go to trial, the
government would need to greatly increase the number of courts and
judges.' Further benefits of plea bargains include: protecting society
from accused defendants who are prone to commit further crimes
while on pre-trial release; shortening the time between the filing of
charges and final disposition, which increases chances of
rehabilitation; and finality and the efficient conclusion of criminal
proceedings.76
If a primary purpose of 5K is viewed as encouraging plea bargains
and cooperation, the section has enjoyed great success. Since the
guidelines were introduced in 1987, nearly ninety percent of
defendants in criminal cases have entered guilty pleas.'
In 1996
alone, approximately 12,000 defendants not only pled guilty, but
received a downward departure for their pleas. 78 Nearly two-thirds of
these downward departures were the result of substantial assistance
agreements. 79
As these numbers indicate, prosecutors have used their discretion
to reward thousands of defendants who provided assistance. But
prosecutors have also shown a willingness to exercise their discretion
not to offer cooperative defendants the opportunity to enter a
substantial assistance agreement. In fact, while two-thirds of all
defendants in criminal cases provide some assistance to the
72. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
73. See id. at 260-61.
74. Id.at 260; see also Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 222 (1978) (expressing
the view that the government has a legitimate interest in facilitating plea agreements);
Roland Acevedo, Is a Ban on Plea Bargainingan Ethical Abuse of Discretion? A
Bronx County, New York Case Study, 64 Fordham L Rev. 987, 991-92 (1995)
(examining the mutual advantages of plea bargaining).

75. See Santobello, 404 U.S. at 260.
76. See id. at 261.
77. See USSG, supra note 5, ch. 1, pt. A; Gyurci, supra note 56, at 1264.
78. See Ian Weinstein, Substantial Assistance and Sentence Severity: Is There a

Correlation?,11 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 2 (Sept.-Oct. 1998).
79. See id. Although there are other circumstances in which judges can depart
from the guidelines, these instances are primarily limited to those occasions where the
defendant has no prior criminal history and is willing to accept responsibility for the
crime committed or where extenuating family circumstances exist. See generally Stith
& Cabranes, supra note 61.
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government, many of these defendants offer their cooperation without
having entered into agreements. Only 38.6% of the defendants who
cooperate with prosecutors, either through formal agreements or
informally, receive the benefit of a substantial assistance departure
motion from prosecutors.'0 For the many defendants who provide
assistance but do not receive 5K motions, simply demonstrating that
they provided substantial assistance is not enough to force prosecutors
to enter and fulfill substantial assistance agreements.8 1 While the
majority of cooperation agreements are fulfilled, the courts are
littered with cases in which prosecutors have refused to honor the
agreements they formed with defendants. Just as courts will not
compel prosecutors to enter into a substantial assistance agreement,
they will typically refuse to force a prosecutor to honor an existing
agreement absent a showing of bad faith.
C. Enforcement of SubstantialAssistance Agreements and the Legal
Standardof Review
Substantial assistance agreements are a type of plea agreement
because they require a plea of guilty by the cooperating defendant.,
Although prosecutors are given tremendous discretion in whether to
forge a plea agreement, once one is entered into the prosecutor's
discretion becomes more limited.' In Santobello v. New York,' a
prosecutor entered into a plea agreement with the defendant under
which the defendant agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a promise
by the prosecutor that he would not make a sentence
recommendation.8 5 At the defendant's sentencing, a new prosecutor
who claimed to be unaware of the agreement and not bound by
another's promise, refused to honor his predecessor's agreement. 6
The Supreme Court held that "when a plea rests in any significant
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be
said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must
be fulfilled."' In explaining its reasoning, the Court spoke in terms of
contract law principles," finding that the defendant had "'bargained'
and negotiated for a particular plea," and that the conduct of the
prosecution amounted to a breach.89
80. See Cynthia Lee & Brian Derdowski, Jr., The Future of SubstantialAssistance:
Recommendations for Reform, 11 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 2 (Sept.-Oct. 1998).
81. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181,186 (1992).
82. See Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 563,
567 (1999).
83. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,262 (1971).
84. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
85. See id. at 258.
86. See id. at 259.
87. Id. at 262.
88. See id.
89. Id.
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Consistent with Santobello, courts have come to regard plea
agreements as contracts and apply contract law principles, such as
breach, consideration, and the duties of performance and good-faith
in their review of plea agreements. 90 For example, in Margalli-Olvera
v. INS,91 the Eighth Circuit stated that "[p]lea agreements are
contractual in nature, and are interpreted according to general
contract principles."' Courts thus apply contract law principles to
determine whether the agreement signed by the defendant and the
government constitutes a binding agreement, 93 and what remedy
should apply where the court finds that the agreement has been
breached. 9
Although the substantial assistance agreement is a type of plea
bargain, it is unique, and certain enforcement issues arise in relation
to substantial assistance agreements that do not arise in general plea
agreement cases. Unlike most plea agreements, the government's
duty to perform is tenuously conditioned on the government's
approval of the defendant's cooperation. Section 5Kl.1 states, and
most agreements echo,95 that the government can submit a downward
departure motion if it96 deems the defendant to have provided
"substantial assistance."

Courts have offered their interpretations as

to what "substantial assistance" requires, including actual assistance
that yields some sort of result that is useful to the government." The
90. See, e.g., Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir. 1994) (explaining
that contract law principles apply to substantial assistance agreements); United States
v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 713 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. San Pedro, 781 F.
Supp. 761, 771 (S.D. Fla. 1991) ("A plea agreement is a contract between the
defendant and the United States. Therefore, although constrained at times by due
process implications, commercial contract principles govern the interpretation and
enforcement of plea agreements.").
91. 43 F.3d 345 (8th Cir. 1994).
92. I.at 351.
93. See San Pedro v. United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1068 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[T]o
enforce a promise made during plea negotiations, there must have been a valid,
binding agreement in the first instance upon which the defendant relied in deciding to
forego his constitutional rights and plead guilty.").
94. See United States v. Nelson, 717 F. Supp. 682, 685 (D. Minn. 1989) (explaining
that if the court finds that the government breached the contract, it can order specific
performance).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1485 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing a
plea agreement requiring substantial assistance prior to the submission of a dovnaward
departure motion); San Pedro, 781 F. Supp. at 763 (referring to a plea agreement
where the prosecution may recommend a more lenient sentence in exchange for
defendant's cooperation).
96. USSG, supra note 5, § 5K1.1.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Gonsalves, 121 F.3d 1416, 1419 (11 th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1067 (1998) ("'Substantial assistance' generally requires that the
defendant's assistance has yielded results that are useful to the government, not
merely that the defendant expended substantial effort or good faith in attempting to
assist." (emphasis omitted)); United States v. Torres, 33 F.3d 130, 133 (1st Cir. 1994)
(explaining that 5K was amended in 1989 to make clear that the assistance had to
actually be provided and not simply attempted).
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definition that is most important, however, is the one applied by each
prosecutor to the specific case at issue.98 In United States v. Torres,99

for example, the court reasoned that what constitutes "substantial
assistance" is a matter left to the discretion of the prosecutor.) ° In
addition, the court did not object to the fact that the government took
a "hard line" approach to101the "broad scope of its authority to discern
'substantial assistance."'
The prosecutor had defined "substantial
assistance" as requiring an actual arrest and conviction, ;' a definition
that is common among prosecutors. 3 This ability to define
"substantial assistance" places a great deal of discretion in the hands
of prosecutors and makes it exceedingly difficult for a defendant to
challenge the refusal of a prosecutor to submit a downward departure
motion."3 4
Aside from placing a great deal of power and discretion in the
hands of prosecutors, the ability to define "substantial assistance"
makes these agreements what contract scholars refer to as satisfaction
contracts.105 A satisfaction contract allows one of the parties to be
excused from its duty to perform if that party is not satisfied with the

performance of the other party." In the case of substantial assistance
agreements, the contracts are usually worded in such a manner as to at
least imply that the prosecutor does not have a duty to perform if he

or she is not satisfied by the level of assistance provided by the
cooperating defendant. 1°7 Although courts will distinguish between
"implied" and "actual" satisfaction conditions contained in
commercial contracts, °s this does not seem to be a frequent
98. See Torres, 33 F.3d at 133.
99. 33 F.3d 130 (1st Cir. 1994).
100. See id. at 133.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 131-32.
103. See United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1993) (demonstrating
a prosecutor's insistence on actual arrests derived from defendant's cooperation).
104. See Gyurci, supra note 56, at 1272-73.
105. See John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 11.37 (4th
ed. 1998) (describing a type of contract in which the lack of personal satisfaction by
one of the parties to the contract may serve as an excuse of condition).
106. See id.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d 1483, 1485 (2d Cir. 1992)
(providing an example of a cooperation agreement worded to give the government an
implied excuse of condition if it is not satisfied by the level of cooperation: "The
United States reserves the right to evaluate the nature and extent of defendant's
cooperation" (emphasis omitted)); see also United States v. San Pedro, 781 F. Supp.
761, 763-64 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (providing an example of an implied condition of
satisfaction).
108. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 105, § 11.37 (explaining that implied
satisfaction requires only reasonable performance, while actual satisfaction often
requires nothing less than performance to subjective satisfaction). It is worth noting,
however, that there are some courts that will hold the government to its duty to
perform on the basis of substantial performance by the cooperating defendant. See,
e.g., Ramallo v. Reno, 931 F. Supp. 884, 894-95 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that the
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distinction made by courts in reviewing cooperation agreements.
More often than not, courts require that the defendant's level of
cooperation must meet the arbitrary satisfaction of the prosecutor.
Courts thus require only that the government base its decision on a
good faith analysis of the assistance offered by the defendant.', For
example, in United States v. Nelson,"0 the court refused to force the
prosecution to offer a downward departure motion when the
prosecution was honestly dissatisfied with the level of assistance
provided by the defendant."1
Although the defendant in Nelson
eventually provided detailed information about drug activities, the
prosecutors considered his initial answers to their questions to be
evasive.112 The defendant was also reluctant to play a pro-active role
in the government's investigation,
and the information he provided
13
arrests.
any
to
lead
not
did
The fact that substantial assistance agreements are satisfaction
contracts differentiates them from ordinary plea agreements and has
forced courts to consider what the standard of review should be when
a prosecutor refuses to make a 5K motion and fulfill his or her duty of
performance. The most definitive standard was set forth by the
Supreme Court in 1992 in Wade v. United States."4 The Court began
by clarifying that the inclusion of the phrase "[u]pon motion of the
government" ' s in section 5K specifically restricts courts from
departing from the prescribed guideline range for cooperation unless
the government-ordinarily through the prosecutor-formally makes
a motion to the court indicating that departure is appropriate." 6 The
government cannot avoid its contractual obligation if the cooperator substantially

complied with the cooperation agreement and any deviation is minor and of no
significant legal effect).

109. See United States v. Nelson, 717 F. Supp. 682, 685 (D. Minn. 1989) (-Although
the government clearly reserved the right to determine whether to recommend a
downward departure, it has an obligation to make that determination in good faith.");

see also United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 714 (2d Cir. 1990) ("There is... an
implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing in every contract.

A prosecutor's

determination of dissatisfaction... cannot be made invidiously or in bad faith."
(citation omitted)); San Pedro, 781 F. Supp. at 773 ("Notwithstanding the plea
agreement's silence on the issue, courts regularly supply a term imposing on both

parties to a contract a duty of good faith and fair dealing.").
110. 717 F. Supp. 682 (D. Minn. 1989).

111. See id. at 686.
112. See id. at 684.
113. See id.
114. 504 U.S. 181 (1992).
115. USSG, supra note 5, § 5K1.1.

116. See Wade, 504 U.S. at 185 (recognizing that a government motion is required
for a downward departure under 5K); see also United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492,

1498 (11th Cir. 1993) ("A district court's ability to impose a sentence below a
statutory minimum is restricted by [5K] to instances when the government moves for
such a departure based upon a defendant's substantial assistance."); United States v.

Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 713 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The decision to make the motion is thus
expressly lodged in the prosecutor's discretion.").

1258

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

Court's requirement of a government motion places a tremendous
amount of power in the hands of the prosecutor and necessarily
restrains the courts' ability to review prosecutors' decisions not to
offer 5K motions."7 In Wade, the Court explained that judges have
the authority to review prosecutors' 5K decisions only for narrow
abuses: "[F]ederal district courts have authority to review a
prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion and to grant
a remedy if they find that the refusal was based on an unconstitutional
motive.""' 8 In determining whether the motive is unconstitutional,
courts may review the decision to ensure that it is rationally related to
some legitimate government end."19
As an example of an
unconstitutional motive that bears no relationship to a legitimate
government end, the Court reasoned that a court could act if it found
that a prosecutor had refused
a departure motion on the basis of the
20
defendant's race or religion.
The Wade holding has been interpreted by courts to mean that
prosecutors cannot be compelled to offer a downward departure if
they can demonstrate that their actions were made in good faith and
are consistent with the principles of contract law. 12' This standard is
obviously very generous to prosecutors. Although courts will not
allow prosecutors to unilaterally rescind a plea agreement for no valid
reason,122 courts have shown a willingness to accept nearly any
contractual argument as a good faith reason for rescinding the
agreement. For example, courts have refused to enforce agreements
when the prosecutor can make a good faith argument that the
defendant should not be granted a 5K letter because, in the
prosecutor's mind, the defendant breached his contractual obligation
to provide substantial assistance by lying, 23 by not being thoroughly
candid, 24 or because the information did not result in any arrests or
convictions."z
When courts do enforce substantial assistance
agreements, they often give prosecutors great latitude in fulfilling
their duty to offer a downward departure motion. In several cases,
117. See Gershman, supra note 62, at 419-20; Stith & Cabranes, supra note 61, at
130.
118. Wade, 504 U.S. at 185-86.
119. See id. at 186.
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., United States v. Brechner, 99 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining
that prosecutors have great discretion whether to offer a 5K motion, and that courts
can review their decisions only for bad-faith); United States v. Torres, 33 F.3d 130,
133 (1st Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1500-01 (11th Cir.
1993) (same).
122. See United States v. Reardon, 787 F.2d 512, 516 (10th Cir. 1986) ("Plea
bargains, like contracts, cannot normally be unilaterally broken with impunity or
without consequence.").
123. See Brechner,99 F.3d at 100; United States v. Pollack, 91 F.3d 331, 336 (2d Cir.
1996).
124. See United States v. Nelson, 717 F. Supp. 682, 684 (D. Minn. 1989).
125. See Torres, 33 F.3d at 133.
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courts have enforced the letter of the agreement, but allowed the
prosecutor to violate the spirit of the agreement. 2 6 In these cases,
prosecutors were able to undermine the effectiveness of their
downward departure motions by making speeches at the defendant's
sentencing that implied that the court should ignore the 5K motion.
By taking such a liberal view of what constitutes performance and
good faith, courts have effectively weakened the Santobello principle
that promises that induce pleas must be fulfilled.
Moreover, this
liberal approach has created a legal standard that allows prosecutors
to easily escape their duty to perform. The next part will discuss
whether this weakened legal standard is superseded by a heightened
ethical duty of prosecutors to honor contractual agreements entered
into with criminal defendants.
II. THE ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF PROSECUTORS AS
DISTINGUISHED FROM THOSE OF THE PRIVATE LAWYER

The extremely lenient legal standard of good faith makes it very
easy for prosecutors to meet their legal obligation in the context of
fulfilling their 5K agreements. The law, however, does not provide
the only set of obligations that lawyers must satisfy. Beyond their
legal duties, lawyers are subject to ethical duties that must be fulfilled.
In many circumstances, ethical responsibilities require more of
lawyers than does the law.'2 Specific ethical responsibilities, however,
differ depending on the role of the individual lawyer within the legal
system. In order to determine whether ethical norms require more of
prosecutors than does contract law, this part first examines how the
role of the private lawyer shapes his or her ethical responsibilities in
negotiating commercial contracts. It then focuses on prosecutors and
explores whether their unique role engenders different ethical
responsibilities than those faced by private lawyers, and if so, how this
role affects their conduct with respect to cooperation agreements.
A. The Private Lawyer
The ethical responsibilities of lawyers are shaped by the role they
play in the legal system. It is therefore critical to understand the role
126. See, eg., United States v. Jimenez, 928 F.2d 356, 364 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding
that the defendant was not entitled to an enthusiastic recommendation, and that an

unenthusiastic recommendation is still a recommendation); United States v. Hand,
913 F.2d 854, 857 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that simply because the prosecutor
recommended a reduction, the prosecutor need not stand mute if the prosecutor

believes there is additional information of which the court should be aware); United
States v. Benson, 836 F.2d 1133, 1136 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that there was no

breach by the government where the prosecutor satisfied the letter of the agreement
even if he had deviated from its spirit).
127. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,262 (1971).

128. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
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of the private lawyer in order to understand why the norms of ethics
have developed as they have. The American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct defines the lawyer's role as "a
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.", 29 In
practical terms, the lawyer's primary role is as the representative of

those lacking the skill or knowledge to represent themselves in the
legal system. 30 As representatives, lawyers enter a fiduciary
relationship with their clients, in which the lawyer serves as the agent
and the client as the principal. 31 This relationship requires the
lawyer's near total loyalty to the client and the client's interests. 32
Such a high premium is placed on loyalty due to the adversarial nature
of the American legal system.1 33 As a fiduciary representative, the
lawyer's responsibility is to serve as a zealous advocate of the interests
of his or her client.'3

The belief that lawyers must act as zealous advocates is so powerful
that it is the foundation upon which the ethical rules for lawyers are
constructed.1 35 Because ethical norms view the lawyer's responsibility
as a zealous advocate, those norms not only allow, but encourage,
aggressive advocacy. As advocates, lawyers are thus ethically allowed
to urge any permissible construction of the law that is beneficial to

their clients, whether or not they believe the interpretation will be
accepted by the court. 36 In addition, lawyers are expected to attempt

to resolve any legal issues that may be in doubt in favor of their

129. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Preamble (1998) (discussing the
lawyer's responsibilities).
130. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics 145-46 (1986) (explaining that
people hire lawyers because lawyers have special skills and knowledge not shared by
members of the public, which would be uneconomical for most people to attempt to
acquire).
131. See id. at 146 (discussing the idea that the attorney-client relationship is based
on fiduciary principles).
132. See id. (discussing the client's expectation of complete loyalty from the
lawyer).
133. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System 2
(1975) [hereinafter Freedman, Adversary System] (discussing the manner in which
our adversary system of law places the interests of the individual in due process and
trial by jury above the interests of the state).
134. See The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct Preamble (1982) ("In the
context of the adversary system, it is clear that the lawyer for a private party is and
should be an officer of a court only in the sense of serving a court as a zealous,
partisan advocate of one side of the case before it .... ").
135. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility Canon 7 (1980) ("A Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."); Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3 cmt. (1983) ("A lawyer should act with commitment
and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's
behalf.").
136. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-4 (cautioning that a legal
theory presented to a court must not be frivolous and must be asserted in good faith).
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clients 37 An extreme view of this advocacy role states that a lawyer
should not be concerned wvith anyone but the client and should be
willing to do anything in order to advance the interests of the client."
The duty to act as a zealous advocate is not confined to the
courtroom. Even in the negotiation and performance of contracts,
lawyers are instructed to act as advocates and to seek the result most

advantageous to their clients.139 Ethics standards reason that lawyers
must always be conscious of the reality that they function in an
adversary system and that today's negotiation may be the subject of
tomorrow's litigation. 14 The acceptance of the belief that the lawyer

must act as a zealous advocate even in negotiations has resulted in a
system in which misleading the opposition is a shrewd tactic employed
even by those lawyers considered to be among the most forthright,
honest, and trustworthy, and which is tacitly approved of by the legal

community. 141 Although ethical principles do not explicitly condone

this view, their emphasis on zealous advocacy does little to discourage

this behavior and actually encourages it to the extent that it is not
explicitly prohibited. In fact, when the Model Rules were drafted,

137. See id. EC 7-3 ("Where the bounds of law are uncertain, the action of a lawyer
may depend on whether he is serving as advocate or adviser ....While serving as
advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds of the
law." (citation omitted)).
138. See Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 65-66 (1990)
[hereinafter Freedman, Understanding Ethics].
"[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst them,
to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon
others."
Id. (quoting Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821)).
139. See generally Model Rules of Professional Conduct Preamble (1998)
(discussing the lawyer's responsibilities as a negotiator).
140. See The American Lawyer' Code of Conduct Preamble (1982) ("Lawyers
function in an adversary system even when their clients are not actually involved in
litigation.... The lawyer drafting a contract or a will must anticipate and guard
against interests adverse to the client's that may exist or that may develop in the
course of time."); Freedman, Understanding Ethics, supra note 137, at 66. Professor
Freedman cautions:
It is important to remember, however, that any lawyer who counsels a client,
negotiates on a client's behalf, or drafts a legal document for a client must do
so with an actual or potential adversary in mind.... The advice given to a
client and acted upon today may strengthen or weaken the client's position
in litigation next year. In short, it is not just the advocate in the courtroom
who functions in an adversary system, and it is not just the client currently in
litigation who may require and be entitled to "warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights."
Id
141. See generally Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75
Iowa L. Rev. 1219, 1220-21 (1990). Professor WVetlaufer argues that lying in
negotiations is accepted practice and is even considered a virtue. Id.
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language specifically requiring truth in negotiations was rejected. 4
Thus, ethical canons do not require the lawyer representing the
private client in contract negotiations or disputes to do anything more
than the law requires. Those who feel they have been taken
advantage of by an immoral lawyer receive no more protection from
the rules of ethics than they do from the common law, which simply
postulates caveat emptor 43 If the rules of ethics have any true impact

on the way lawyers think about contracts, it is to encourage them to
interpret the terms of the contract and the law in the manner most
advantageous to their clients, 144 or to encourage lawyers to use the law
as a tool to advance clients' interests, even if that 45means creating or
exploiting a loophole to avoid the duty to perform.
The majority of lawyers handling negotiations and contractual
disputes are able to accomplish the goals of their clients while acting
in an evenhanded manner. In some circumstances, however, other
ethical norms are subjugated to the duty of zealous advocacy. 46 A
private lawyer thus need not consider principles of community
morality or the integrity of the legal profession in negotiating
contracts, but must only abide by legal requirements and the ethical
duty of zealous advocacy. Does this mean that a cooperating
defendant entering into an agreement with a prosecutor can expect no
protection from legal ethics in enforcing the agreement, and can rely
only on the protection of the law? Or are prosecutors' ethical
responsibilities such that they are treated differently from ordinary
lawyers and subjected to additional ethical responsibilities? The next
sections explore these questions.
B. The Prosecutor
As with all lawyers, the ethical responsibilities of prosecutors begin
with an understanding of the role they play in the legal system. The
role of the prosecutor is as the government's lawyer in the criminal
justice system. With respect to 5K agreements, although the
prosecutor signs the agreement, she does so on behalf of the entire
government. 147 In essence, a prosecutor who enters into a substantial
142. See Michael H. Rubin, The Ethics of Negotiations: Are There Any?, 56 La. L.
Rev. 447,452 (1995) (citing the Center for Professional Responsibility, American Bar
Association, The Legislative History of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Their Development in the ABA House of Delegates (1987)).
143. See id. at 462.
144. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text; cf. Rubin, supra note 142, at
451 (explaining that achieving the best result for the client is paramount). See
generally Wetlaufer, supra note 141 (discussing the use of lies in negotiation to gain
advantages for the client).
146. See Rubin, supra note 142, at 451 (claiming that acting as a zealous advocate
for the client can overwhelm an even-handed approach to negotiations).
147. See United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294,302-03 (4th Cir. 1986) ("Though the
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assistance agreement negotiates and executes a contract on behalf of
the government. Thus, the prosecutor fulfills very much the same role
in a 5K negotiation or dispute as does a lawyer for a private client in a
contract negotiation or dispute. But is the role of the prosecutor truly
the same? Or is the role different, and thus are the prosecutor's
ethical responsibilities different from those of other lawyers?'
The
generally recognized answer is that prosecutors have a substantially
distinct role and "professional ethos" from that of private lawyers.14 9
The fact that the Model Rules contain a rule that is special to, and
specifically written for, prosecutors seems to provide clear evidence
that prosecutors serve a unique role in the criminal justice system."'
Government negotiates its plea agreements through the agency of specific United
States Attorneys-as necessarily it must-the agreements reached are those of the
Government.").
148. See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 Fordham
Urb. LJ. 607, 610 (1999) (discussing how the professional ethos of prosecutors is
different from that of other lawyers).
149. See Freedman, Adversary System, supra note 133, at 79 (discussing the
understanding that prosecutors and defense lawyers have different roles and functions
that lead to different ethical difficulties and solutions); see also Dr. George T.
Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 Sw. U. L Rev. 98, 98 (1975)
(discussing the role and responsibilities of prosecutors); Roberta K. Flowers, What
You See is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of Impropriety Standard to
Prosecutors, 63 Mo. L. Rev. 699, 728-32 (1998) (discussing how the role of the
prosecutor is unique).
150. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 (1998). The special
responsibilities of the prosecutor are to:
(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause;
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of
the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given
reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important
pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing;
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with the sentencing, disclose to the
defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to
the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility
by a protective order of the tribunal;
(e) exercise reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement
personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with the
prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the
prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6;
(f) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to
present evidence about a past or present client unless the prosecutor
reasonably believes:
(1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any
applicable privilege;
(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an
ongoing investigation or prosecution; and
(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.
(g) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the
nature and extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law
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The distinction stems from the recognition that, unlike the private
lawyer, the prosecutor does not have a single client.1 51 The prosecutor
represents the interests of the government, which translates into
representing the interests of society in general. 152 This unique role as
the representative of society not only inheres prosecutors with
additional powers,'53 but also with additional ethical responsibilities.
Thus, conduct that would be tolerable on the part of a private

attorney is not necessarily tolerable on the part of a prosecutor. 54

The most common description of the role of the prosecutor is as a

"minister of justice.' ' 55 One formulation of this role of a "minister of
justice" describes it as balancing legislative pronouncements with the
individual circumstances of each case while always considering the
public interest.'5 6

Justice Douglas asserts that the role of the

prosecutor is to "vindicate the rights of people as expressed in the
laws and give those accused of crime a fair trial."' 57 The most famous,
and arguably most important, attempt at defining the role of the
prosecutor, however, was expressed in Berger v. United States.5

In

Berger,the Court stated:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary
enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have
a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused.
Id., accord Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, The
Prosecution Function (1992).
151. See Wolfram, supra note 130, at 759 ("The office of prosecutor can best be
conceptualized as a lawyer with no client but with several important constituencies."
(citation omitted)).
152. See Carol A. Corrigan, Commentary, On ProsecutorialEthics, 13 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 537, 537 (1987) ("The prosecutor occupies a unique role in a legal system
predicated generally on individual representation. The prosecutor does not represent
the victim of a crime, the police, or any individual. Instead, the prosecutor represents
society as a whole." (citation omitted)); Secunda, supra note 52, at 1280-81 (discussing
the unique role of the federal prosecutor).
153. See generally Freedman, Adversary System, supra note 133 (providing
examples of the difference between the government and individual citizen);
Gershman, supra note 62 (describing how the balance of the criminal justice system is
skewed to the advantage of the prosecutor).
154. See Freedman, Understanding Ethics, supra note 138, at 214 (recognizing the
distinct role of the prosecutor).
155. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 cmt. (1998) ("A prosecutor has
the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.");
Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice Standard 3-1.2 ("The
prosecutor is an administrator of justice."); Model Code of Professional
Responsibility EC 7-13 (1981) ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from
that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict." (citation
omitted)).
156. See Daniel C. Richman, Foreword to The Changing Role of the Federal
Prosecutor,26 Fordham Urb. L.J. at vii. (1999) ("At its core, the prosecutor's job
always has been to mediate between spectacularly broad legislative pronouncements
and the equities of individual cases, giving due attention to the public interest and
such technical matters as evidentiary sufficiency." (citation omitted)).
157. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 649 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
158. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
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party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold
aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He
may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so.
But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction
159 as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.
These views share an implicit understanding that not only is the role
of the prosecutor different from that of the ordinary lawyer, but that
as a "minister of justice," the prosecutor is beholden to a different
ethical standard.' 60 This notion is supported by the realization that
behavior that would be tolerated from a lawyer representing a private
client is not always tolerated from a prosecutor. 6 1 In the words of the
ABA and the Association of American Law Schools, "[t]he public
prosecutor cannot take as a guide for the conduct of his office the
standards of an attorney appearing on behalf of an individual client.
The freedom elsewhere visely granted to partisan advocacy must be
severely curtailed if the prosecutor's duties are to be properly
discharged."" 6 In support of this position, the Model Rules place
special restrictions on prosecutors that exceed those applied to other
lawyers. 16
The unmistakable message contained in these norms is that
prosecutors are held to a different, and arguably higher, ethical
standard than are private lawyers.1 What then is the ethical
obligation faced by prosecutors as ministers of justice? The manner in
which the obligation is ordinarily phrased is as a "duty to seek

159. Id. at 88 (criticizing an overzealous prosecutor for misstating facts and other
indiscretions in an attempt to gain a conviction in a counterfeiting case).
160. See Freedman, Understanding Ethics, supra note 138, at 215 (-[The
prosecutor's ethical standards] are different as a result of the prosecutor's distinctive
role in the administration of justice.").
161. See supra note 149. An example of this difference is the treatment of
evidence. While it is clear that a defense lawyer does not have a responsibility to
disclose evidence to the prosecution that it knows may inculpate his or her client, a
prosecutor must turn over evidence that may exculpate the defendant. See Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(d)
(1998).
162. ABA & Ass'n of American Law Schools, ProfessionalResponsibility: Report
of the Joint Conference,44 A.B.A. J. 1159,1218 (1958).
163. See supra note 150, providing text of Model Rule 3.8.
164. See Kenneth J. Melilli, ProsecutorialDiscretionin an Adversar, System, 1992
BYU L. Rev. 669, 699 (1992) (explaining that Rule 3.8 is "meaninglessly redundant if
it means only that the prosecutor is prohibited from violating other, specific ethical
rules").
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justice."' 65 Clearly, the prosecutor's ethical duty to seek justice is far
more stringent than the ethical responsibility of the private lawyer to
serve as a zealous advocate. Yet the duty to "seek justice" is, at least
at first blush, rather amorphous and difficult to grasp. In order to
understand the exact nature of the prosecutor's ethical duty,
particularly with respect to the performance of substantial assistance
agreements, the phrase "seek justice" must be given more precise
meaning. An understanding of what "seeking justice" entails makes it
possible to understand how prosecutors should behave with respect to
the 5K contracts that they have negotiated on behalf of the
government.
C. The Meaning of "Seek Justice"
The primary goal of any lawyer, including and especially a
prosecutor, should be to fulfill her ethical responsibilities. A
prosecutor's ethical integrity is vitally important because prosecutors
hold virtually unilateral discretion over whom to investigate, whom to
charge, who should receive plea agreements, who should be
compelled to testify, and other key decisions in the administration of
criminal justice. 166 The prosecutor thus has a greater impact on the
course of the criminal justice system than does any other party. 67 A
prosecutor who fulfills her ethical duties will also fulfill her legal
duties because the ethics norms encompass the legal responsibilities of
lawyers. Thus, a prosecutor's primary goal should be to fulfill her
ethical duty, which is to "seek justice." The phrase "seek justice,"
however, is vague and leaves a great deal of latitude for individual
interpretation. 16s Understanding what is meant by "seek justice" is
crucial because the ethical responsibility of the prosecutor hinges
165. See Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice Standard 31.2(c) (1992) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.");
accord United States v. Bartelho, 129 F.3d 663, 670 (1st Cir. 1997) (describing the
prosecutor's duty as seeking truth and ensuring that justice is done); Model Code of
Professional Responsibility EC 7-13 (1981).
166. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 Harv. L.

Rev. 1521, 1524-37 (1981) (describing the vast discretion that prosecutors enjoy in a
number of important areas, such as in charging decisions and plea bargaining); supra
note 165.
167. See Freedman, Understanding Ethics, supra note 138, at 213; Stith &
Cabranes, supra note 61, at 130-36; Vorenberg, supra note 166, at 1524-37.
168. See Michael Q. English, Note, A Prosecutor's Use of Inconsistent Factual
Theories of a Crime in Successive Trials: Zealous Advocacy or a Due Process

Violation?. 68 Fordham L. Rev. 525, 555 (1999); see also Fred C. Zacharias,
Structuring the Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice: Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?, 44

Vand. L. Rev. 45, 48 (1991) ("The 'do justice' standard, however, establishes no
identifiable norm. Its vagueness leaves prosecutors with only their individual sense of
morality to determine just conduct."); David Aaron, Note, Ethics, Law Enforcement,
and Fair Dealing: A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Nonevidentiary Information, 67

Fordham L. Rev. 3005, 3026 (1999) (noting that the ethical standards provide very
few specific duties of the prosecutor).
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upon this interpretation. In turn, in light of the low good-faith legal
standard, the degree to which a prosecutor should feel compelled to
fulfill his or her promise to issue a 5K motion is largely determined by
the responsibility to "seek justice."
Interpretations of "seek justice" vary among scholars and
prosecutors from definitions that are narrow in scope to those that are
rather broad. Among those who take a narrow view of "seek justice"
are prosecutors who view themselves as zealous advocates and
measure their success only in terms of convictions.'" In a study of
prosecutors, Dr. Felkenes found that nearly one-third of those
prosecutors surveyed viewed their primary function as securing
convictions. 170 One such respondent indicated that justice meant "'the
guilty person must be found guilty."'''
Professor Zacharias
subscribes to only a moderately more liberal view of "seek justice."
He concludes that "seek justice" has "two fairly limited prongs: (1)
prosecutors should not prosecute unless they have a good faith belief
that the defendant is guilty; and, (2) prosecutors must ensure that the
basic elements of the adversary system exist at trial."" - Among those
subscribing to a more liberal definition of "seek justice," Professor
Green reasons that "[d]oing justice comprises various objectives
[primarily fairness and due process] which are, for the most part,
implicit in our constitutional and statutory schemes. They derive from
our understanding of what it means for the sovereign to govern
fairly.- 173 This Note argues that a liberal definition that considers the
many disparate aspects of the prosecutor's role is the more
appropriate definition.
It is clear from the language of the Model Code of Professional
Conduct174 that the duty of the prosecutor goes beyond simply gaining
convictions, and that "seeking justice" is about more than simply
convicting the guilty.175 Many courts and legal scholars view the role
169. See Felkenes, supra note 149, at 109 (offering an empirical study showing the
tendency among prosecutors to view their role as to gain convictions); Melilli, supra
note 164, at 685-86.
170. See Felkenes, supra note 149, at 109.

171. See id at 111.
172. Zacharias, supra note 168, at 49.

173. Green, supra note 148, at 634. Professor Green provides examples of the
objectives of "seek justice" that include: "enforcing the criminal law by convicting
and punishing some (but not all) of those who commit crimes; avoiding punishment of
those who are innocent of criminal wrongdoing... and affording the accused, and
others, a lawful, fair process." Id
174. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13 (1981) ("The
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is

to seek justice, not merely to convict.").
175. See Zacharias, supra note 168, at 53 (explaining that when read as a whole, the
ethics codes suggest a view of justice that is based on the adversary system and is not
"outcome-oriented"); see also United States v. Vaccaro, 115 F.3d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir.
1997) (arguing that prosecutors should be zealous but not to the point that ambition

for a conviction jeopardizes integrity); Felkenes, supra note 149, at 109 ("It is the
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of the prosecutor as having two separate, yet equal parts: a duty to
convict the guilty and a duty to seek justice. 176 A better view that
more accurately describes both the role and duty of the prosecutor is
that the responsibility to obtain convictions is subsumed within the
larger duty to seek justice. 177 This view recognizes that the prosecutor
is not simply the advocate for the victim, but acts as the legal

representative of society as a whole. 8 As such, the prosecutor owes a
duty not only to the victim, but to all of the many constituencies she
represents. 179
Chief among these constituencies is the law-abiding public. As their
representative in the criminal justice system, the prosecutor bears the
burden of upholding public faith in the system.1 80 The importance of
this responsibility is expressed by Professor Corrigan: "[i]f our nation
of laws is to remain both strong and free, we must have a system of
criminal justice in which every citizen can have confidence."' 181 In
order to maintain confidence in the system, it is incumbent upon
prosecutors that they not punish the innocent, 1 2 abuse the power or
primary responsibility of the prosecutor to see that justice is achieved rather than to
assure conviction.").
176. See, e.g., John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of
PrivateProsecutors,47 Ark. L. Rev. 511, 543 (1994) (explaining that prosecutors have
a dual role in the criminal justice system, one aspect of which is to obtain convictions
and the other of which includes preventing the conviction and punishment of innocent
people); Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error,ProsecutoralMisconduct, and Due
Process: There's More to Due Process than the Bottom Line, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1298,
1303 (1988) (describing prosecutors as having a dual role as both advocates seeking
convictions and as public servants); Note, Let's Make a Deal: A Look at United
States v. Dailey and Prosecutor-Witness Cooperation Agreements, 67 B.U. L. Rev.
749, 762 (1987) [hereinafter Let's Make a Deal] ("The prosecutor, on the other hand,
is not concerned solely with winning the case, but with seeing that 'justice shall be
done."'); see also United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that prosecutors must be both zealous advocates and protectors of
fairness); United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 1998) (same).
177. See Melilli, supra note 164, at 698 ("If prosecutors truly accept their obligation
to define the public interest they represent, the apparent conflict between zealous
advocacy on behalf of the state and 'seeking justice' disappears."); Zacharias, supra
note 168, at 56-60 (arguing that the prosecutor's duty is to help achieve "adversarial
justice").
178. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
179. See Corrigan, supra note 152, at 538 (describing the prosecutor as the
spokesperson for the "People"); see also Wolfram, supra note 130, at 759-60
(discussing the role of the prosecutor as the representative of the public in the
criminal justice system).
180. See Corrigan, supra note 152, at 540 (discussing the need for the prosecutor to
act fairly so as to uphold the public's faith in the criminal justice system); see also In re
Petition for Review of Opinion 569 of the Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, 511 A.2d
119, 122 (N.J. 1986) (explaining how the public's trust in government is dependent
upon its employees); Flowers, supra note 149, at 703 (discussing how the public's
perception of the prosecutor affects its perception of the criminal justice system as a
whole, and the prosecutor's responsibility to foster confidence in the system).
181. Corrigan, supra note 152, at 543.
182. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1967) (White, J., concurring)
("Law enforcement officers have the obligation to convict the guilty and to make sure
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discretion afforded by their office,'1 or treat witnesses unfairly or
dishonestly."' The concept of "seeking justice," therefore, must
include protecting public confidence in the criminal justice system by
refraining from behavior that impugns the integrity of the justice
system. 1 5
Also included among the constituencies to whom the prosecutor
owes a duty to "seek justice" is the defendant himself."t One of the
most basic tenets of the criminal justice system is that it is better that a
guilty defendant escape conviction than that an innocent one be
punished."a The duty to see that an innocent person is not sent to
prison lies primarily with the prosecutor.11 As the Supreme Court
stated in Brady v. Maryland,'1 9 "[s]ociety wins not only when the
guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated
unfairly." 190

Because a prosecutor with great integrity is the best protection a
defendant has, 19' federal prosecutors have a special responsibility to
use their powers in accordance with the principles of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'9 The meaning of due process,
however, is nearly as vague as that of "seeking justice," and courts
have struggled at times to determine exactly how far due process

that they do not convict the innocent."); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935) (same); Green, supra note 148, at 640 (same); Melilli, supra note 164, at 699

(same).
183. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
184. See generally Berger, 295 U.S. 78 (providing an example of overzealous
treatment of a witness by a prosecutor having an adverse affect on the criminal justice
system); see also Brown v. Borg, 951 F.2d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that it
is not only important for a prosecutor to gain a conviction but to obtain it fairly).
185. See Zacharias, supra note 168, at 59-60.
186. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 cmt. (1983) (explaining that
"seek justice" carries with it specific obligations that the defendant be accorded
procedural fairness and that guilt be based on evaluation of the evidence); Melili,
supra note 164, at 697-98 (explaining that the prosecutor's ethical duty extends to the
defendant even after he has been charged).
187. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(arguing that the social cost of convicting an innocent man is greater than that of
acquitting someone who is guilty); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (expressing belief that it is better that a criminal go
free than that the government play an ignoble part in putting an innocent person in
prison); see also English, supra note 168 passin.
188. See Bessler, supra note 176, at 543; see also Wolfram, supra note 130, at 759
("[Prosecutors] bear alone the state's considerable responsibility to see that no
innocent person is prosecuted, convicted, or punished.").
189. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
190. Id. at 87.
191. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 6.
192. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law..." U.S. Const. amend. V.
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protections extend.193 What is clear is that "fundamental fairness has
become the touchstone of due process."' 94 Thus, a basic premise of
due process, and the criminal justice system as a whole, is that not
only should the correct outcome be reached, but that the correct
outcome be reached through a system that is fundamentally fair to the
defendant. 195
In order to ensure that the system is fair to criminal defendants,
courts have imposed several restrictions on prosecutors in the name of
due process. These protections include not withholding exculpatory
evidence,'9 6 not allowing the use of perjured testimony, 197 and
forbidding prosecutors from intentionally delaying indictments to
prejudice a defendant.' 9 While due process restrictions provide the
legal guarantee of fairness to defendants, the prosecutor's duty to seek
justice is intended to provide an even greater ethical guarantee of
fairness.1 99 The rules, canons, and codes of ethics are meant to serve
as a supplement to the law and act to hold lawyers to a higher
standard than does the law itself."° This point is made clear by the
number of cases in which the court found ethical violations that
demanded the sanctioning of the prosecutor, but did not require that a
guilty verdict be overturned. °' In People v. Rice, 2 for example, the
193. See Fisher, supra note 176, at 1300; see also Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S.
342, 352-53 (1990) (discussing the meaning of due process); Yvette A. Beeman, Note,
Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea Agreements, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 800,

803 (1987) (describing the standards of due process).
194. Fisher, supra note 176, at 1300.
195. See id.; see also Bessler, supra note 176, at 552 ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is
a basic requirement of due process." (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955)).

196. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (finding that a prosecutor's
withholding of evidence that is favorable to a defendant violates due process).
197. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (using perjured testimony to
obtain a conviction violates due process).
198. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,324 (1971) (holding intentional preindictment delay by prosecutor, that causes prejudice, to be a violation of due
process).
199. See Brown v. Borg, 951 F.2d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the
limits of prosecutorial conduct were developed to protect the right of defendants to a
fair trial).
200. See Bessler, supra note 176, at 547 (explaining that ethical duties are different
from regulatory constraints); Aaron, supra note 168, at 3026 ("Ethics therefore
extend professional obligations beyond the limits imposed by law.").
201. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
that although the prosecutors' misconduct rose to an intolerable level, it did not
constitute prejudice and require dismissal of the indictment); United States v. Lopez,
989 F.2d 1032, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 1993) (refusing to dismiss the defendant's indictment
as a remedy for the prosecutor's violation of ethics rules regarding communications
with individuals represented by another lawyer); United States v. Manko, 979 F.2d
900, 909-10 (2d Cir. 1992) (ruling that an ex parte communication between the
prosecutor and the judge was improper, but did not constitute reversible error);
United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1184 (2d Cir. 1981) (explaining that the social
cost of reversing convictions for prosecutorial misconduct that did not prejudice the
defendant is too high, and that a better method is to allow the conviction to stand and
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New York Court of Appeals sternly condemned the actions of the
prosecutor as "reprehensible" and unethical, but because the actions
did not rise to the legal standard of reversible error the court allowed
the defendant's conviction to stand.203 In addition, although the law
does not prevent a prosecutor from subpoenaing a lawyer before a
grand jury to present evidence about a former client, the Model Rules
generally prevent a prosecutor from engaging in this type of
conduct.204
The law thus focuses on verdicts and whether
prosecutorial misconduct may have affected them, while the ethics
provisions are concerned not only with verdicts but with procedure.2 ,
In fact, ethical obligations often require more of lawyers than do their
constitutional obligations,0 6 and require not only that the prosecutor
provide a fair tribunal, but also that the prosecutor treat the
defendant fairly.
Just as with the private lawyer, the ethics of the prosecutor are not
confined by the walls of the courtroom; the obligation to seek justice
governs the actions of prosecutors in the discharge of all of their
duties.20 7 These duties include the negotiation and performance of
plea agreements. Unlike a private lawyer, however, the ethical
responsibility of a prosecutor is not to obtain the best result for her
client, in this case the government.'
Rather, a prosecutor who has
entered into a substantial assistance agreement with a cooperating
defendant and is now faced with a decision as to whether to offer a 5K
letter must act in a manner that is consistent with the duty to "seek
justice." Therefore, where private lawyers are concerned only with
the interests of their clients, a prosecutor must see not only that the
defendant pays for the crime committed, but that the defendant is
treated consistently with the concepts of due process and fairness, and
that public confidence in the system is preserved. The need to balance
all of these factors requires much more of the prosecutor in terms of
satisfying his or her ethical responsibilities than is required of a
private lawyer. Where private lawyers are expected to resolve any
to punish the prosecutor in an alternative manner); People v. Rice, 505 N.E.2d 618,
618 (N.Y. 1987) (finding the prosecutor's use of half-truths reprehensible and not to
be condoned, but not severe enough to warrant a reversal of the defendant's
conviction); see also United States v. Kearns, 5 F.3d 1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1993)
(explaining that in order for an indictment to be dismissed on due process grounds,
the conduct must be grossly shocking and outrageous); Acevedo, supra note 74, at
1004 ("Behavior that is legal can nonetheless be unethical.").
202. 505 N.E.2d 618 (N.Y. 1987).
203. Id. at 618.
204. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8(f) (1983); see also
Zacharias, supra note 168, at 83 (explaining that sometimes the ethical duty of a
prosecutor requires the prosecutor to turn over information that discovery rules do
not require).
205. See Zacharias, supra note 168, at 88.
206. See id. at 113-14.
207. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Preamble (1998).
208. See supra Part II.B.
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possible legal issues in favor of their clients,2 9 and can urge any0
permissible construction of the law that is beneficial to those clients,2
the prosecutor must consider not only what is legally possible but
what is most consistent with the duty to seek justice. Thus, whereas
ethical norms do not require more of the private lawyer than does the
law with respect to contracts, they do require more of prosecutors
than does the law in both negotiating and honoring cooperation
agreements. There are, therefore, instances where a prosecutor,
unlike a private lawyer, is bound by ethical norms not to exploit a
loophole provided by the law. The next part presents a hypothetical
fact pattern in which a prosecutor has entered into a cooperation
agreement with a defendant, and describes several possible scenarios
that illustrate how a prosecutor should behave in order to fulfill the
ethical responsibility to seek justice.
III. THE DUTY TO SEEK JUSTICE AS APPLIED TO THE FULFILLMENT
OF SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS

Unlike the private lawyer, prosecutors have an ethical responsibility
with respect to the negotiation and performance of contracts that
exceeds their legal responsibilities. 1 This duty requires prosecutors
to consider issues of fairness, due process, and public confidence in
the criminal justice system when they act. 12 In order to better
examine and define how this duty to seek justice affects prosecutors'
responsibilities with respect to substantial assistance agreements, this
part sets forth five hypothetical situations and analyzes the
prosecutor's legal and ethical duties in honoring their promises to
recommend downward departures. Each hypothetical is modeled on
a realistic scenario and is designed to explore the differences between
the legal and ethical duties of prosecutors.
Consider the following set of hypothetical facts. An Assistant
United States Attorney enters into a substantial assistance agreement
with a defendant who is charged with possession with intent to
distribute cocaine. Under the guidelines, if found guilty, the
defendant will receive a sentence of between forty-six and fifty-seven
months.2"3 The defendant, however, has entered into a plea
agreement with the government. The defendant agreed to plead
209. See supra note 137.
210. See supra note 136.
211. See supra Part II.
212. See supra Part II.C.
213. In order to understand the potential sentence, assume the defendant was
caught with 350 grams of cocaine. Under the guidelines, the defendant has been
charged with an offense carrying a base level of 22. See USSG, supra note 5, § 2D1.I.

Further, assume that the defendant is not a first-time offender, but rather has two

criminal history points, thus placing him in criminal history category II. See id. §
4AL.1. The intersection of the offense level and the criminal history result in a
possible sentence of 46-57 months. See id. ch.5, pt. A.
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guilty to the charges he faces, to provide information to the
government about his dealer, and to testify as a prosecution witness at
the dealer's trial. In exchange for this cooperation, the prosecutor
agreed to submit to the court a 5K letter detailing the defendant's
assistance and recommending that the judge depart from the
guidelines and give the defendant a lesser sentence than that
prescribed by the guidelines. The agreement is memorialized in a
standard written form that requires the defendant to "provid[e]
complete, candid and truthful" 214 information and testimony before
the grand jury and at trial. The agreement also states that the
determination as to whether to submit a 5K motion
is left to the "sole
2 15
and unfettered discretion of the United States.
Scenario 1: Induced Breach
The defendant has fully performed his end of the agreement, having
provided key information and compelling testimony that led to the
conviction of a prominent drug dealer. In the time since she made the
agreement, however, the prosecutor has regretted her decision to
enter into the agreement. Concerned that a 5K letter would allow the
defendant to serve only a short prison term, the prosecutor is
considering not sending a 5K letter to the court. The prosecutor's
basis for not wanting to move for a downward departure has nothing
to do with the cooperation of the defendant. Rather, the prosecutor
simply believes that the defendant's crimes were serious enough that
214. For the purpose of the hypothetical, assume in pertinent part that the

agreement reads:
Defendant agrees to cooperate fully with the United States Attorney's
Office, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and such other law

enforcement agencies as either of the foregoing may require by: (a)
providing complete, candid and truthful

information

and testimony

concerning trafficking and attempts to traffic in controlled substances by
defendant and others; and (b) appearing at such grand jury proceedings,

hearings, trials, and other judicial proceedings as may be required by the
Office of the United States Attorney.
The United States reserves the right to evaluate the nature and extent of

defendant's cooperation and to advise the Court of the nature and extent of
any such cooperation at the time of sentencing. The United States agrees
that if, in the sole and unfettered discretion of the United States, the
circumstances of defendant's cooperation warrant a departure by the Court

from the Sentencing Guidelines range determined by the Court to be
applicable, the United States will make a motion pursuant to section 5KL.1
of the Sentencing Guidelines stating that defendant has provided substantial

assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has
committed an offense. If it is determined by the United States to make such

a motion, the amount of the departure requested in such motion will lie in
the complete and sole discretion of the United States Attorney.
This language is modeled on agreements at issue in United States v. Knights, 968 F.2d
1483, 1485 (2d Cir. 1992), and United States v. San Pedro, 781 F. Supp. 761, 763-64

(S.D. Fla. 1991).
215. See supra note 214.
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he should be forced to serve the maximum sentence. The prosecutor's
decision not to make the 5K motion is thus a unilateral, subjective
decision to refuse to honor the agreement based solely on the
prosecutor's desire that the defendant serve as much time as possible.
In this situation, the law effectively compels the prosecutor to offer
16
the downward departure motion. Under principles of contract law,1
the agreement represents a valid and enforceable contract. 217 The
requirements that each party must meet are established by the written
agreement and governed by the duty of good faith.2 18 By providing
the cooperation requested, the defendant fully performed and fulfilled
the condition precedent to the prosecutor's duty to perform. If the
prosecutor refused to offer the 5K motion, she would effectively be
rescinding the contract unilaterally-an action forbidden by contract
law. 219 Refusing to offer the downward departure motion would also
be inconsistent with the principles of Santobello that require
fulfillment of the promise if it served in any way to induce the
defendant's guilty plea.22 ° Thus, performance is required by the law,
and an analysis of the ethical duty to perform is unnecessary in this
instance because the prosecutor is legally obligated to honor the
agreement.
Suppose the prosecutor attempts to avoid her duty to perform by
baiting the cooperator into perjuring himself before the grand jury.
The prosecutor then attempts to use this perjury as evidence that the
defendant did not meet the terms of the agreement because he failed
to give complete and honest testimony. Both the law and the
prosecutor's duty to seek justice are in accord with respect to this type
of conduct. The legal duty of good faith and fair dealing that is
implicit in all contracts and plea agreements does not allow a
"'
prosecutor to attempt to prevent the defendant from performing.22
Similarly, the duty to seek justice would
view such an action as a
222
violation of the basic norms of fairness.
Scenario 2: Indirect v. Direct Means
Imagine instead that the prosecutor still wishes to avoid the
agreement, but recognizes that her hands are tied and that she must
216. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (explaining that courts apply

contract law principles when determining the enforceability of a substantial assistance
agreement).
217. It is clear from the signed writing that mutual assent exists and that the
exchange of cooperation for a 5K motion represents the necessary consideration.
218. See supra Part I.C.
219. See United States v. Reardon, 787 F.2d 512, 516 (10th Cir. 1986) ("Plea
bargains, like contracts, cannot normally be unilaterally broken with impunity or
without consequence.").
220. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); supra notes 83-89 and
accompanying text.
221. See United States v. San Pedro, 781 F. Supp. 761,774 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
222. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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offer the downward departure motion. The prosecutor also
recognizes, however, that the agreement only requires her to alert the
court to the fact that the defendant has provided substantial
Based on this interpretation, the prosecutor submits a
assistance.'
5K letter to the court, but at the defendant's sentencing the
prosecutor proceeds to explain to the court that it should know that
the government considers the defendant to be a very high-ranking
drug dealer who poses a serious threat to the community. It is clear
from the tone and substance of the prosecutor's statement that she
believes that the judge should use his judicial discretion to ignore the
5K letter and not grant the defendant a downward departure. 4 The
prosecutor thus employs an indirect means of subverting the
agreement while abiding by its technical terms.
Many courts would interpret the law to allow such behavior. In
fact, a number of courts have held that prosecutors are bound only to

the letter of the agreements they sign and not to their spirit.' To
their credit, other courts have held that plea agreements are no place
for the government to resort to literalism,"- 6 and that the government
cannot be permitted to do indirectly that which it could not do
directly. 7
Although the prosecutor, should she find herself in the "right"
courtroom, could indirectly undermine the agreement while fulfilling
her duty to perform, the duty to seek justice should prevent such
conduct. Making a statement to attempt to influence the court to
sentence the defendant within the guidelines, when the defendant has
complied in good faith with the agreement, is inconsistent with the
223. See supra note 214 for the text of the hypothetical agreement.
224. The described conduct by the prosecutor is nearly identical to that of the
prosecutor in United States v. Jinenez, 928 F.2d 356, 360-61 (10th Cir. 1991). and
similar to that of the prosecutor in United States v. Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 856-57 (10th
Cir. 1990).
225. See, e.g., Jimenez, 928 F.2d at 364 (finding that the defendant was not entitled
to an enthusiastic recommendation, and that an unenthusiastic recommendation is
still a recommendation); Hand, 913 F.2d at 856 (stating that simply because the
prosecutor recommended a reduction, the prosecutor need not stand mute if the
prosecutor believes there is additional information which the court should know);
United States v. Benson, 836 F.2d 1133, 1136 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that there was
no breach by the government where the prosecutor satisfied the letter of the
agreement even if he had deviated from its spirit).
226. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 70 F.3d 563,565-66 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the government cannot resort to literalism in order to fulfill its duty under a plea
agreement); United States v. Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253, 256 (10th Cir. 1989) (-We will
not allow the government to resort to a rigidly literal construction of the language of
the plea agreement...."); United States v. Greenwood, 812 F.2d 632, 635 (10th Cir.
1987) (refusing to allow the prosecutor to resort to literalism)- accord United States v.
Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1507 (11th Cir. 1993) (Clark, J., dissenting) (preventing the
prosecution from doing indirectly that which it is prohibited from doing directly).
227. See, eg., United States v. Stemm, 847 F.2d 636, 638 n.1 (10th Cir. 1988)
(refusing to "condone the Government accomplishing through indirect means what it
promised not to do directly"); accordShorteeth, 887 F.2d at 256 (same).
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prosecutor's obligation to act with fairness and honestyrequirements that are implicit in the duty to seek justice.228 While
such actions may not rise to the level of a due process violation,229 they
certainly constitute conduct that deprives the defendant of a fair
process by what functionally amounts to deceit. Statements such as
the one discussed essentially deprive the defendant of the promised
benefit because the actual recommendation of the prosecutor is that
the defendant serve the guideline-prescribed sentence. A system in
which the defendant can meet every one of his obligations and still be
denied his promised benefit is fundamentally unfair.
Additionally, this type of conduct would serve to undermine
confidence in the criminal justice system, something that the duty to
seek justice requires the prosecutor to act to preserve.210 Although
the number of defendants who enter into cooperation agreements
remains high, it is not unreasonable to believe that future defendants
would be understandably leery of entering into substantial assistance
agreements if they knew a prosecutor could undermine the effect of
the benefit promised to them as cooperators. Such behavior may thus
serve to undermine the confidence defendants and their attorneys
have in the effectiveness of plea agreements, and thus undermine the
confidence of at least a portion of the public in the system itself.
Future defendants would be justified in refusing to believe that
prosecutors will fulfill their promises, and thus make them less apt to
cooperate for lack of confidence that they will be treated fairly and
honestly. For these reasons, the ethical duties of the prosecutor must
be read to prevent indirect means of avoiding a cooperation
agreement where the defendant has fully performed.
Scenario3: Failureof Condition
Imagine instead a scenario in which, despite the good-faith
cooperation of the defendant, the assistance did not result in a
conviction of the dealer, although the information was used and was
to a certain degree helpful in preparing a case against the other
defendant. In her honest judgment, the prosecutor believes that
because there was no conviction, the assistance provided did not rise
to the level of substantial assistance. Can the prosecutor here refuse
to offer the downward departure motion?
The legal standard indicates that the prosecutor would be acting
properly were she to refuse to submit a downward departure
motion. 231 The prosecutor can make a very strong argument that the
defendant failed to perform his end of the agreement, and therefore
the prosecutor need not perform. The prosecutor could claim that the
228.
229.
230.
231.

See supra notes 180-207 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 191-204 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text.
See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
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contract reserved to the prosecutor the power to "evaluate the nature
and extent of the defendant's cooperation" for the government, and
that the determination as to whether the cooperation rises to the level
of substantial assistance so as to warrant a departure motion
- 2 was left
to the "sole and unfettered discretion of the United States."
Applying the legal standard of review, the arguments made by the
prosecutor are not only valid based on contract principles, but can
also be made in good faith. In United States v. Forney,23 the court
recognized that prosecutors intentionally draft cooperation
agreements so as to reserve sole power to determine the usefulness of
the cooperation, and approved of such draftsmanship. -- The court
blessed this practice as "the essence of prosecutorial discretion." 5
Based on this reasoning, the court in Forney held that there was no
breach by the government in similar circumstances to those described
here 6 The effect of these decisions has been to place the definition
of substantial assistance largely in the hands of prosecutors.
There is little doubt that most courts would not overturn a decision
not to offer the downward departure on these facts.-1 In light of that
conclusion, using the failure of condition to avoid the duty to perform
is certainly the type of zealous advocacy that would be expected
ethically of the private attorney,m but may not be consistent with the
prosecutor's duty to seek justice. Implicit in the prosecutor's duty to
seek justice is the obligation to ensure that through her actions,
confidence in the system and its integrity are maintained. 9 Enticing a
defendant into cooperating by the allure of a downward departure
motion, only to deny such a motion by exploiting a subjective
condition in the contract, jeopardizes the integrity of the government
in future plea negotiations. It also undermines the confidence of
future defendants-or more accurately defense lawyers who will likely
find themselves in similar discussions in the future-that they will be
treated fairly should they enter into an agreement. 2,0
232. See supra note 214 (setting forth the hypothetical cooperation agreement).
233. 9 F.3d 1492 (11th Cir. 1993).
234. See id. at 1501 nA.
235. Id. at 1502 n.4.
236. See id. at 1504.
237. See supra notes 96-113 and accompanying text.
238. See supra Part II.A.
239. See supra notes 178-85 and accompanying text.
240. Some may argue that the current rate of 90% of cases resolved by pleas is an
indication that defendants and their lawyers are as willing as ever to enter into plea
bargains. The high percentage of pleas, however, is a testament to the threat of harsh
sentences under the guidelines, not of faith in the government's integrity. See
Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, supra note 82, at 566 & n.12. The
purpose of meeting a higher ethical standard is not only to ensure that plea bargains
remain a useful tool for the disposition of cases, but also to preserve the government's
integrity. If the government's integrity suffers, so does its ability to negotiate pleas in
cases where the threat of the guidelines is not enough or where the evidence is too
weak to force a plea.
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On the other hand, the agreement-and for that matter the
guidelines-is conditioned on the defendant providing substantial
assistance for good reason. If a prosecutor cannot reserve the right to
evaluate the assistance provided and in some cases refuse to offer the
downward departure motion, there would be no way of ensuring the
usefulness of the cooperation. Defendants could lure prosecutors into
substantial assistance agreements by hinting at helpful information
only to provide useless gossip. Absent some element of subjective
evaluation, prosecutors wary of being duped would be far more
reluctant to offer cooperation agreements, and a valuable tool for the
disposition and prosecution of crimes would be severely weakened.
There is undoubtedly a measure of validity to this argument. In
fact, this argument is supported by the reality that section 5K1.1 was
amended in 1989 to clarify that the defendant must actually provide
substantial assistance, not simply offer it.24 There are no doubt
circumstances in which the prosecutor may well be acting consistently
with the duty to seek justice by refusing to offer the 5K motion. A
prosecutor who can defend such action at least in part on the basis
that it was necessary to prevent the defendant's actions from
damaging the integrity of cooperation agreements, or on the grounds
that the action was fair because the cooperator either knew his
assistance was not substantial or never intended it to be so, would
likely be fulfilling his ethical duties.
If the 5K motion is denied, however, for no reason other than that
the prosecutor believes that the lack of a conviction makes the
assistance per se insubstantial, then the refusal of the motion is not
consistent with the duty to seek justice. Such a refusal would violate
basic principles of fairness by holding the cooperator to a standard
based on something other than the true usefulness of his testimony.
The wording of section 5K does not require a conviction or arrest,""
and a definition of "substantial assistance" that relies on such
requirements unfairly forces the defendant to meet a standard beyond
his control. It may well be that the acquittal in this hypothetical was
based on the ineffectiveness of the government's other witnesses or
counsel. To penalize the cooperator for that result would not be
consistent with the prosecutor's duty to seek justice toward the
cooperator.
Instead, the duty to seek justice should require
prosecutors to honor substantial assistance agreements if the
defendant acts in good faith to provide potentially useful assistance.
Although the prosecutor would legally be permitted to refuse to
offer the downward departure motion in this scenario because she
could act in good faith under current constructions of "substantial
assistance," and is not basing her decision on any unconstitutional
241. See USSG, supra note 5, at app. C, amd. 290.
242. See id., supra note 5, § 5K1.1.
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motive, the prosecutor may still be forced by the duty to seek justice
to offer the motion. By doing so she acts fairly toward the defendant,
consistent with notions of due process, and preserves the overall
integrity of the criminal justice system. "43
Scenario 4: Non-MaterialBreach
Taking the hypothetical one step further, imagine that the
prosecutor learns that the defendant has perjured himself in the
course of his grand jury testimony. The perjurious statement is
relatively innocuous and is not important to the outcome of either the
grand jury proceedings or the dealer's trial. Can the prosecutor refuse
to offer a 5K motion? The prosecutor can in good faith argue that she
is discharged from her legal duty to perform because the cooperator,
by failing to be candid and truthful as required by the agreement, is
in breach of contract and that there exists no duty to perform on the
government's part. In further support of the breach theory, the
prosecutor can argue that by committing perjury the defendant
jeopardized his credibility and usefulness as a witness, thereby greatly
weakening the government's case.2 45
Again, just as with scenario three, -' 6 the prosecutor has an ethical
duty to seek justice that requires more of the prosecutor than that she
simply be able to make a good faith argument for breach of contract.
Before deciding not to honor the agreement, the prosecutor must
determine whether such a refusal is truly fair in light of the level of
cooperation offered by the cooperator. If the assistance was offered
in good faith and did in fact lead to a conviction, or even just an arrest,
is that assistance actually tarnished by the innocuous perjury, or does
the peijury simply provide the prosecutor with an excuse to refuse the
motion? It is true that offering the motion would allow the defendant
to get away with a lie, but the conviction provides clear evidence that
the lie did not affect the outcome of the dealer's trial.
Even had a conviction not been achieved, if the perjury was not the
reason for the lack of a conviction it should not affect the defendant's
entitlement to the motion. If, on the other hand, the lie had affected
243. It is worth noting that some courts believe that the prosecution is not only

ethically, but also legally, forbidden from backing out of an agreement simply because
it did not like the testimony provided. See, e.g., Thomas v. I.N.S., 35 F.3d 1332, 1342
(9th Cir. 1994) ("A criminal's testimony often lacks the persuasive force of plain

truth, even when it is true, and often it is hard to know whether it is true. The
government bargained for a criminal's testimony, and cannot avoid paying the agreed
price because of buyer's remorse.").
244. See supra note 214.
245. This was the argument advanced by the prosecution and accepted by the court
in United States v. Brediner,99 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996), in which the cooperator lied
during a debriefing with the prosecutor. The court held that even though the
cooperator almost immediately corrected himself, the government was still within its
right to deny the cooperator a 5K motion. See id. at 99-100.
246. See supra Part III, Scenario 3.
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the outcome of the trial or even threatened the prosecution's case, the
lie would represent a material breach and not a non-material one. In
that situation the prosecutor would be justified both legally and
ethically in denying the downward departure motion. The ethical
justification for the refusal stems from the fact that the denial would
be fair, consistent with due process, and actually preserve the integrity
of the system by sending a clear message that defendants cannot abuse
cooperation agreements.
A more reasonable alternative in the case of a non-material breach
would be to make the 5K motion, but to recommend a lesser
departure than the prosecutor might otherwise recommend. The risk
of this approach is that it can undermine the purpose of the motion, as
described in scenario one, if the recommendation lacks sincerity. 247
To deny the motion altogether, however, simply on the basis of a nonmaterial breach, would result in a punishment disproportionate to the
misconduct, and therefore inconsistent with concepts of fairness and
the principle of "seeking justice.""24
Scenario 5: Fraudin the Inducement
Finally, suppose the prosecutor learns, subsequent to entering the
agreement, that the defendant actually had a significantly larger role
in the drug organization than the prosecutor originally perceived. The
prosecutor is upset because she never would have entered the
agreement had she been aware of the magnitude of the cooperator's
involvement in the drug organization. As a result of the cooperator's
assistance, the top people in the organization were arrested and
convicted. Nonetheless, the prosecutor is considering refusing to send
a 5K motion to the court because now that she realizes the full extent
of the defendant's involvement she wishes the defendant to receive a
longer sentence.
The prosecutor can in good faith argue that the contract she signed
with the defendant is unenforceable because it is void on the basis of
fraud in the inducement. 249 The prosecutor's argument is that the
defendant affirmatively misrepresented the level of his involvement in
illegal activities in order to induce the prosecutor into signing a plea
agreement. Additionally, if the prosecutor learned of the defendant's
involvement in a manner other than a proffer by the defendant, 15 the
247. See supra Part III, Scenario 1.
248. See supra notes 192-204 and accompanying text.
249. See Brian A. Blum, Contracts: Examples & Explanations § 13.6 (1998)
(explaining that if the signer of an agreement was induced to sign by a
misrepresentation, the contract is voidable); Calamari & Perillo, supra note 105, §
9.22 (same).
250. Substantial assistance agreements routinely include a provision that the
cooperator cannot be prosecuted for any crimes that the prosecution learns of as a
result of the cooperation; therefore it is likely that the cooperator in this hypothetical
would inform the prosecutor of his level of involvement during a proffer session or
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prosecutor may claim that she is legally justified in not offering the 5K
motion because the defendant lied and therefore violated the explicit
condition of truthfulness and candor.
Some of the courts that refused to force prosecutors to honor their
agreements have done so in part on the belief that in circumstances
similar to the one described here, the prosecutor has a duty to inform
the court of the true level of the defendant's involvement in criminal
activities."' The decisions provide the important restriction that the
government must have learned of the full extent of the cooperator's
criminal history after signing the plea agreement, and cannot have
known of the information at the time of the agreement.- The courts
reason that prosecutors have an ethical duty to inform the court of the
defendant's criminal past so that the judge can make a wen-informed
decision as to the appropriate sentence, even with a departure.P
Courts of this opinion believe that allowing the prosecutor to act in
this manner is consistent with both the ethical and contractual duties
of prosecution. Their thinking is based on the belief that the deal
requires only a recommendation that the court depart, and that the
responsibility is fulfilled even if it is an unenthusiastic and conflicted
recommendation.'
The opinion that an unenthusiastic and conflicted recommendation
fulfills the prosecutor's duty with respect to the agreement is not
consistent with the ethical duty to seek justice. It may be consistent
with the narrow theory that "seek justice" means that all criminals
should be convicted and sentenced in a manner directly proportional
to their crimes, but it is not consistent with the notion of "seek justice"
adopted by this Note and the majority of commentators., 5 Under the
better view of "seek justice,"' ' 6 offering an unenthusiastic and
conflicted recommendation would violate the duty because a weak
recommendation will be interpreted by the court as a
recommendation that no departure be granted at all. A weak
recommendation that is not accepted by the court would undermine
the confidence in the system and the integrity of substantial assistance
agreements overall.3
Although one can argue that the defendant undermines the
debriefing. See, e.g., United States v. San Pedro, 781 F. Supp. 761,764 (S.D. Fla. 1991)
(providing an example of a standard cooperation agreement that prevents the
prosecution from charging the defendant for any crimes based on evidence that the
prosecution learns of through the defendant's cooperation).
251. See United States v. Jimenez, 928 F.2d 356,363 (10th Cir. 1991); accord United
States v. Cooper, 70 F.3d 563,566-67 (10th Cir. 1995).
252. See Cooper,70 F.3d at 566.
253. See id.; Jimenez, 928 F.2d at 363.
254. See Cooper,70 F.3d at 566-67; Jhnenez, 928 F.2d at 364.
255. See supra Part II.C.
256. See supra Part III.A.
257. See supra Part III, Scenario 2.
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integrity of the agreement with his misrepresentations, such an
argument is blind to the realities of the criminal justice system. To
paraphrase the court in Thomas v. INS, 8 the prosecution knows it is
bargaining with a criminal and therefore must enter any agreement
with the understanding that the defendant's past is less than
reputable. 9 That is not to say that the defendant should be allowed
to be less than truthful in the information he provides, rather it is to
say that the defendant should not be expected to incriminate himself.
To expect the defendant to completely disclose his criminal conduct to
the prosecutor before receiving immunity for his information is
unrealistic and runs contrary to the adversary system of criminal
justice. Expecting the defendant to divulge all information and
refusing to offer a downward departure bargained for, or offering one
calculated to be ineffective, if the defendant has not provided such
information violates reasonable definitions of fairness. Such a refusal
also violates the duty to seek justice on the grounds that it is simply
disingenuous and places the desire for a severe sentence ahead of
fairness.2" This is especially true in light of the fact that the withheld
information has no bearing on the trial of the defendants for which
the assistance is promised. A more appropriate solution is to expect
the government to fully investigate the cooperator's past before
entering into a substantial assistance agreement. Thus, as with the
other scenarios discussed in this Note, a prosecutor who exploits the
legal argument may well be acting consistently with the law, but at the
same time failing to fulfill his or her ethical duty to seek justice. The
denial would be unfair and deny the defendant due process by forcing
him to either incriminate himself or lose the benefit of the
cooperation agreement. Such a denial would undermine the integrity
of the system.
Admittedly, the hypothetical situations discussed in this Note are to
some degree designed to lead to the conclusion that the prosecutor
typically has an ethical responsibility to submit a downward departure
motion where the defendant has acted in good faith to substantially
assist the prosecutor. As noted, there are indeed circumstances in
which a prosecutor would be both legally and ethically justified in
refusing to offer the 5K motion, such as where the defendant
materially breaches the agreement by intentionally providing false
information, perjurs himself on the stand in such a way that conviction
of the other defendant is jeopardized, misrepresents the extent of his
knowledge, or refuses to answer questions. The intention of the
hypothetical scenarios discussed is not to propose a rule that a
prosecutor can never legally or ethically back away from a substantial
258. 35 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1994).
259. See id. at 1342.
260. See United States v. Jones, 983 F.2d 1425, 1433 (7th Cir. 1993) (explaining that
the prosecutor's duty is to seek the fairest sentence, not the most severe sentence).
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assistance agreement. Rather, this Note argues that a prosecutor has
a responsibility to act not only legally, but also ethically, when
determining whether or not to honor a substantial assistance
agreement.
Thus, a prosecutor must be truly above the law in all her actions,
seeking to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system by
treating the defendant fairly and consistently with due process notions
and by upholding public confidence in judicial procedures. The
prosecutor must do this even when the law does not require that she
do so. Therefore, a prosecutor should honor the agreement when the
cooperator fails to meet a condition of a substantial assistance
agreement that is not critical to the prosecution of the other
defendant, when a defendant's information is offered in good faith but
does not lead to a conviction, or when a defendant does not reveal his
full criminal history. In addition, a prosecutor should never seek to
induce a breach by the cooperator or attempt to achieve indirectly
what she could not achieve directly under the terms of the agreement.
CONCLUSION

As the representative of the government and of society as a whole,
the prosecutor is entrusted with an enormous amount of
responsibility. It is a responsibility that is characterized in ethical
terms as a duty to seek justice. Although "seek justice" is a vague and
ethereal concept, any definition that considers the power, prestige,
and role of the prosecutor in administering criminal justice must
conclude that "seek justice" is broad in its mandate. Under this
interpretation, "seek justice" must include notions of fairness, due
process, honesty and truthfulness, and proportionality. The phrase
must also include a responsibility to protect the integrity of the
criminal justice system so as to maintain public confidence. This is a
far greater, and at times more demanding, ethical burden than the one
faced by attorneys representing private clients.
This enormous ethical responsibility to seek justice governs the
prosecutor in all that he or she does. At times, like any ethical
responsibility, the duty to seek justice requires more of the prosecutor
than does the law. This is certainly true with respect to the duty of the
prosecutor to honor a substantial assistance agreement. A prosecutor
who does not wish to offer a substantial assistance motion can usually
find a legally permissible means of avoiding the agreement so long as
he or she is acting in good faith under traditional contract principles.
Simply because the prosecutor has a legal escape, however, does not
mean that avoiding the responsibility to honor agreements is
consistent with the ethical responsibility to seek justice.
As important a role as the law should play in guiding the conduct of
a prosecutor, the duty to seek justice cannot be ignored. With respect
to the prosecutor's performance of a substantial assistance agreement,
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a prosecutor must act not only in good faith, but must do so in a
manner that protects the defendant's right to a fair process, preserves
the public's confidence in the criminal justice system, and ensures that
the guilty are punished in accordance with their crimes. Thus, when a
cooperating defendant complies in good faith with the terms of a
substantial assistance agreement, the prosecutor has an ethical
responsibility that goes well beyond her legal responsibility to honor
the agreement. Even if the assistance does not lead to a concrete
result, such as arrest or conviction, notions of fairness demand that the
agreement be honored if the defendant has used his or her best efforts
to assist the prosecution. Likewise, failures of a non-material nature,
such as a defendant's evasiveness as to the extent of criminal
participation or perjury that does not affect the other defendant's
trial, should be excused and the prosecutor required to perform.
Although this is more than the law demands of prosecutors, it is
precisely what their duty to seek justice demands.

